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Robust Flight Deck Systems:
Harnessing the Synergistic Power of the Crew
Michael J. Stasio
Pilot, United Airlines/Human Factors Consultant

Abstract
Robust flight decks are possible in both normal and novel operations. Existing crew resource and error management programs can
improve team-centered resilience with Oshry’s organization development (OD) principles. The need on the flight deck is to diminish the
invisible behavioral gap between espoused theory and theory-in-use by balancing Oshry’s four basic elements that make up robust human
systems—differentiation, homogenization, integration, and individuation. This low-cost OD vision is offered as a guide for organizations
to tailor existing aircrew recurrent training modules. Assessment and diagnosis measures are recommended for continuous improvement,
so this OD framework includes adaptive feedback interventions and soft-skills behavioral markers for organizations to consider.

Introduction
Team leaders set the behavioral tone and interaction cues as examples for team members to follow. Since leaders transfer
ideas through language, this paper is grounded in communication and leadership praxis. In high-risk environments, teams
instead of individuals typically operate complex equipment and technologies. Human–technology aviation systems require
humans to cooperate and communicate with clarifying language to increase performance and team situational awareness
(TmSA)—use active listening, share critical observations, verbalize and verify critical actions, and monitor and crosscheck
crew action and computer management systems (Gunther, 2010; Orlady, 2010).
Purpose
Commercial airline pilots are generally high-achieving successful professionals, ‘‘and because they have rarely failed,
they have never learned how to learn from failure’’ (Argyris, 2006, p. 268). Even with proven crew resource management
(CRM) programs that exemplify organization development (OD) processes and serve as models for several safety-critical
sectors (Gawande, 2009; Kanki, Helmreich, & Anca, 2010; Vicente, 2006), many captains and first officers today display
concern about their performance and exhibit unilateral tendencies in dynamic situations under stress or high workload
(Salas, Fowlkes, Stout, Milanovich, & Prince, 1999). Often their natural reflexive response is individualistic, unilateral
control and win–lose (Argyris, 2006; Klein, 1998; Schwarz, 2005). This is the difference between ‘‘espoused’’ theory in
CRM team principles and actual pilot performance ‘‘theory-in-use’’ on the frontline (Argyris, 2006, p. 274). In other words,
pilots may be ‘‘unaware of the contradiction between the way they think they are acting and the way they really act’’
(Argyris, 2006, p. 274). This common unconscious paradox identified among high-risk professionals, i.e., doctors, first
responders, pilots, business executives, military officers (Argyris, 2006; Klein, 1998), tends to stifle what could be a robust
human system. In this paper I discuss and diagnose leadership behavior at the flight deck subsystem level specifically based
on Oshry’s vision to create robust human systems (Sales, 2006). The need on the flight deck is to diminish the invisible gap
between espoused theory and theory-in-use by balancing Oshry’s four basic elements to build robust human systems—
differentiation, homogenization, integration, and individuation (paraphrased in Sales, 2006).
Brief History
For decades aviation management and union safety representatives formulated mission statements focused on safety, but
espoused safety values did not prevent several fatal accidents during the 1970s due to flight deck communication and
leadership dysfunction, e.g., Eastern Airlines Flight 401 attributed to fixation and failure to monitor and delegate tasks; the
Tenerife disaster and United Airlines Flight 173 in Portland, both attributed to authoritarian captains and crewmember
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unassertiveness. Jointly, airline management, outside consultants, and pilot union safety representatives developed
and established the first-generation operational CRM
program (Blake, Mouton, & CLR Steering Committee
and Working Groups, 1982). Now, laws and regulations
mandate CRM training in America and in more than 190
countries (Kanki et al., 2010; Vicente, 2006). Fifthgeneration program principles that include flexible leadership patterns and proactive open communication make up
the understructure to integrate CRM and threat and error
management (TEM) (Gunther, 2010; Helmreich, Merritt, &
Wilhelm, 1999). CRM is how aircrews communicate and
manage resources, and since human–machine systems are
fallible, TEM is what aircrews communicate about—
identify and prepare for operational threats, and identify,
trap, and repair errors (Gunther, 2010). Gunther lists many
external threats not controlled by the aircrew, such as
…weather, maintenance, passenger problems, operational pressures [and fatigue], distractions and interruptions, Air Traffic Control (ATC) errors, language/
communication problems, etc…. One of the primary
countermeasures to managing threats effectively is flight
deck leadership. The attributes of flight deck leadership
(i.e., setting the example, planning ahead, initiative,
fostering communications, etc.) are the foundation for
effective strategies to manage threats crews face every
day. (pp. 430–431).
These threats are not pilot crew errors. Threats tend to
change aircrew behavior in contrast to an integration of
CRM/TEM principles because assumptions and values are
grounded in regulations, company policies, and union
statements that embody a pilot-in-command with legitimate
authority and ultimate decision-making capacity. Robust
CRM/TEM involves integration of legitimate authority into
a team culture that harnesses the synergistic power of the
crew. In safety-critical environments there is no question
about the need for the wisdom of a final decision-maker
with quick actions such as for a rejected takeoff near critical
engine failure speed—V1, but humans are fallible in
complex systems and team building may benefit from a
balancing of Oshry’s OD system elements.
The Vision: Building Robustness by Balancing Oshry’s
Four Basic Elements
Differentiation, the first element in robust systems, refers
to ‘‘how and how much a system elaborates differences,
tolerates internal richness, and interacts with a complex
environment’’ (paraphrased in Sales, 2006, p. 334). Pilots
successfully operate in a dynamic environment with
sophisticated equipment, weather, security, radio communications, and multiple layers of interaction with people—
standard briefings and procedures. Given the incredible

amount and complexity of information pilots have to
process, even routine tasks such as busy airport taxi
operations, takeoff and landing, fuel balance, altitude and
route changes, etc. can overwhelm attention and working
memory during critical phases of flight (Loukopoulos,
Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009). Yet even under extreme
pressure, as a whole, the flight deck operates with the
lowest human error rate in history in any of the public
safety-critical sectors—aviation, airport security, nuclear,
healthcare, and environment (Gawande, 2009; Vicente,
2006). External environmental elements/unpredictables, the
confluence of threats outside pilot control produce nonlinear problems and aircrew errors that require open
communication and individuation to create resilience, as
in the following cases:

N AF Flight 447, Atlantic Ocean—fatigue, pilot crew
confusion, weather, human–technology coherence
errors, and airspeed and flight control law failures;
N Colgan Air Flight 3407, Buffalo, NY—fatigue, pilot
crew confusion, weather, human–technology coherence errors;
N UA Flight 232, Sioux City—complete flight control
hydraulic failure;
N USAIR Flight 1549, Captain Sully and crew on the
Hudson—failure of all engines due to migratory bird
ingestion.
Even with a robust CRM/TEM leadership systems model
demonstrated by crewmembers on UA Flight 232 and
USAIR Flight 1549, there still exists an insidious
patriarchal command structure with limited tolerance for
sharing power on the flight deck, predominately in high
power/distance work ‘‘cultures like China, Latin America
and some Asian countries that stress respect for rank, elders
and leaders [as] paramount’’ (Anca, 2010, p. 438).
Inflexible power sharing and decision-making structures
tend to be brittle and are amplified by human–technology
coherence errors, confusion, omissions, complacency, and
when crewmembers are startled.
Oshry ‘‘adds dominance…as an…analytical lens for
understanding the impact of position in formal and
informal systems’’ (paraphrased in Sales, 2006, p. 332)
and clearly describes the dangerous tensions typical in
this leadership dynamic. ‘‘Others feel constrained, confused, oppressed, and angry in the context of a
Dominant-controlled culture’’ (paraphrased in Sales,
2006, p. 333). The old mantra that a ship’s captain is
god not to be questioned or usurped needs ‘‘generative’’
and ‘‘adaptive learning’’ (Senge, 2006, p. 767) models to
displace—which are about creating and coping capacities
respectively. Training and dialogue about how to use
CRM principles to engage threats and errors have the
potential to slowly erode patriarchal boundaries and
transform the flight deck system into a true partnership
by balancing differentiation with homogenization.

M. J. Stasio / Journal of Human Performance in Extreme Environments

The fact that pilots rarely fly with the same crew from
one trip sequence to the next gives special credence to
Oshry’s homogenization—shared safety values, professionalism norms, standard operating procedures (SOPs), jargon,
knowledge, and understanding. Even with these commonalities, we have to support each other in order for the
system to work in normal and novel events, and in what the
future holds.
The promise of Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen) technology to reduce environmental
impact and increase airspace capacity, fuel efficiency, and
crew situational awareness will likely impede pilot ability
to switch attention without omission errors and reduce
working memory, particularly by replacing primary
voice ATC communications with controller–pilot data link
communications in busy terminal airspace operations, and
by shifting responsibility of time-based traffic separation
and severe weather avoidance to the flight deck
(Loukopoulos et al., 2009; Orlady, 2010; U.S. FAA,
2010). In other words, NextGen flight deck technology use
in congested operations that are highly variable and
demanding may reduce TmSA from the current levels
achieved through voice communications. The reality of
day-to-day airline operations is nonlinear—unpredictable
(Loukopoulos et al., 2009). Hamman and Rutherford
(2010) found the following human–technology dynamic:
The main feeling of the line pilot is disengagement with the
design process. New devices show up designed by an
engineer with very little understanding of the line operational environment. This has led to the affectionate saying
about automation: Automation is an amplifier because it

amplifies the low workload times in the flightdeck and it
amplifies the high workload times. (p. 581).
Oshry refers to this complexity as integration. For
example, it takes professionalism and pilot crews utilizing
CRM/TEM, SOPs, ATC, dispatch, maintenance, aircraft
and external systems, federal air marshals, flight attendants,
gate agents, baggage handlers, and passengers as a whole to
ensure safe use of air and ground space. Specifically on the
flight deck, captains can integrate and individuate crewmembers during the preflight briefing: ‘‘We are in this
together to reach our destination, and humans and
technology are fallible, so say something if you are
concerned, uncomfortable or observe anything that is a
threat, unsafe, or not SOP.’’ This CRM preflight briefing
example creates a safe space and invites openness and
critique for individuals to speak up when they observe or
perceive something is not right. The aviation environment
is too complex for one person to process everything, so
captains need to create a proactive communication
environment during preflight and other standardized briefings to increase team member participation. This includes a
workplace where the ‘‘most task-saturated’’ team member
‘‘set[s] the pace for the whole crew’’ by verbalizing
readiness (Loukopoulos et al., 2009, p. 119), where flight
attendants will call the flight deck with safety concerns,
where first officers will stop the aircraft to avert ground
conflicts, where dispatch will send significant weather and
turbulence updates en route, where either pilot will call
‘‘go-around’’ for unstabilized approaches or runway
incursions, and where pilots can hand-fly with basic skills
pitch, power, and roll settings when automated flight

Table 1
Aviation flight deck leadership development and succession planning process.
Phase I: Laying the foundation—self assessment
1. What do I know about myself as a leader?
2. What have I learned through feedback from my peers, instructors, and check airman/evaluators?
3. What do I see as my strengths? (How do I know?)
4. What kind of data from feedback do I need to expand my self-awareness? (From whom? How will I get it?)
5. What is shifting in my life/career that may impact my self-development choices?
6. What is shifting in the organization?
7. Where do I see myself in five years?
8. What kinds of practical learning experiences do I need to reach my goals?
9. What are larger life issues/concerns that I need to consider?
Phase II: Leveraging strengths—utilizing feedback
1. What do others see as my strengths as a leader? (How can I use these strengths to enhance my effectiveness?)
2. What activities or experiences can I undertake to develop my strengths? (What support or resources will I need to make this happen?)
3. What are my areas needing improvement and how do I want to approach improving them?
Phase III: Developing capabilities
1. What areas do I want to grow as a leader? (What new behaviors do I want to develop to enhance my leadership capabilities? What behaviors do I want to
use less frequently?)
2. What activities or experiences will help me develop my leadership capabilities? (What resources or support will I need to make this happen?)
3. What do I want to accomplish? (What does success look like? What are the milestones that will help me assess how I am doing?)
Note. Adapted from Distelhorst, D. J. (n.d.). Session 3: System-wide interventions. In D. Distelhorst (Ed.), An OD practitioner’s tool kit: Twenty years of
accumulated OD wisdom & methodologies (pp. 55–88). Spokane, WA: Gonzaga University Bookstore.
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control systems fail. Balancing these four elements creates
resilience—the capacity for successful adaptation in the
face of challenging or threatening circumstances.
Implementation Through Assessment and Training
In order to uncover our reflexive processes and move to
a more robust flight deck system, Oshry’s vision could be
integrated into recurrent proficiency training cycles using
Distelhorst’s (n.d.) Leadership Development Plan Phase I
Laying the Foundation—Self Assessment as a distance
learning module accompanied by selected readings from
Loukopoulos et al. (2009), Klein (1998), Argyris (2006),
Salas et al. (1999), Sales (2006), Schwarz (2005), Senge
(2006), and Oshry (1999, 2003). This home-study module
could lay the foundation for integration into proficiency
training modules. Pilots would apply Distelhorst’s

Development Plan Phase II and III (see Table 1) and
Oshry’s robust leadership systems model based on ongoing
analysis of actual flight deck communications from deidentified flightcrew testimony/interviews, anonymous
error reports—Aviation Safety Action Program, Line
Operations Safety Audits, and Flight Operations Quality
Assurance. Thematic findings could periodically modify
existing CRM/TEM training modules to represent evolving
operational threats (see Table 2).
Keeping in mind that true strength and generative
learning are found not in perfection, but in understanding
our own limitations, crews debrief with trainers about
specific event sets (Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013) to assess/
diagnose CRM/TEM team performance soft skills using a
NOTECHS behavioral instrument (see Table 3). Training
departments can de-identify the data to evaluate and modify
the syllabus. In order to support a safety/just culture

Table 2
Aviation flight deck modules of training.
OD module
Leadership Development Plan
Phase I
Leadership Development Plan
Phase II
Leadership Development Plan
Phase III
Leadership model

Leadership skills

Performance support and
appraisal process
Manage performance problems

Leadership for a world of
difference

Conflict utilization

Manage pre-flight briefings

Description
Distelhorst’s Phase I: Laying the foundation—provides
a self-assessment tool to reflect on leadership strengths
and areas for growth.
Distelhorst’s Phase II: Leveraging strengths—utilizes
feedback from others to determine what and how to
approach areas of improvement.
Distelhorst’s Phase III: Developing capacities—identifies
areas for growth, goals, and ways to develop leadership
capabilities.
Oshry’s vision of robust leadership model will outline the
mindset shift needed to balance differentiation,
homogenization, integration, and individuation.
Will outline the methods of systems thinking and critical
thinking and focus on the concepts of shared decisionmaking, flexible leadership, team situational awareness,
and communication that invite openness and critique to
maximize resources and facilitate a robust flight deck.
Will outline performance expectations, provide coaching,
and give effective performance feedback to improve
flight deck communication.
Will use robust analysis to uncover underlying issues and
outline a process for managing problems through
dialogic communication and a no-threat performance
improvement process.
Will raise awareness of the flexible leadership knowledge,
skills, and abilities needed to enable groups of culturally
different people to work together effectively—making
difference a resource rather than a problem.
Will outline ways to channel conflict productively, set
norms that avoid unproductive conflict, and provide
processes for conflict management.
Will be used prior to each simulation to practice facilitative
communication needed to ensure robust fight operations.
This is where the captain sets the tone for open
communication.

Implementation
Developed as part of a distance learning module
in preparation for on-site currency training.
Integrated into CRM/TEM on-site currency
training and debriefs.
Integrated into CRM/TEM on-site currency
training and debriefs.
Integrated into distance learning module and CRM/
TEM on-site currency training.
Integrated into CRM/TEM simulator event set
scenarios. The key assumption is ‘‘leadership
capacity develops while leading’’ (Distelhorst,
n.d., p. 75).
Modeled during CRM/TEM debriefing after each
simulator session about specific event sets.
Integrated into CRM/TEM simulator scenarios and
debriefs.

Integrated into distance learning and CRM/TEM
on-site currency training/debriefs.

Integrated into distance learning, CRM/TEM
simulator scenarios, and event set debriefs.
Integrated into CRM/TEM simulator training
scenarios and debriefs.

Note. CRM/TEM principles include the OD systems approach. Adapted from Distelhorst, D. J. (n.d.). Session 3: System-wide interventions. In
D. Distelhorst (Ed.), An OD practitioner’s tool kit: Twenty years of accumulated OD wisdom & methodologies (pp. 55–88). Spokane, WA: Gonzaga
University Bookstore.
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aircraft systems
external environment
time—past, present, future
human resources—internal and external

Cooperation

Developing Very poor

Crew has shared mental model of each task
Crew utilizes standard operating procedures (SOPs)
Crew verbalizes, verifies, and monitors critical action
and automation
Manage threats and errors with proactive language

Awareness
Awareness
Awareness
Awareness

Problem definition & diagnosis
Option generation— ideas, solutions
Risk assessment & option selection in context, i.e.,
judgment
Outcome review, able to adapt in context

Use of flexible authority & assertiveness
Providing & maintaining standards
Planning ahead, fostering comm. & coordination
Workload management

Teambuilding & maintaining
Consideration of others
Support of others
Positive conflict management

Overall Assessment of Flight Deck Team

Communication &
coordination

CRM element

Captain and first officer

Team situational awareness 1
(TmSA)
2
3
4

CRM element

Captain and first officer

Decision-making &
adaptability

CRM element

Captain and first officer

Leadership & management 1
skills
2
3
4

CRM element

Captain and first officer

Cooperation

CRM element

Captain and first officer

Table 3
NOTECHS assessment form—flight deck team.

Proficient

Developing Very poor

Developing Very poor

Developing Very poor

Developing Very poor

Developing Very poor

Proficient

Proficient

Proficient

Proficient

Proficient

Mastery

Mastery

Mastery

Mastery

Mastery

Mastery

Not observed

Not observed

Not observed

Not observed

Not observed

Comments

Comments

Comments

Comments

Comments

Comments
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Note. Adapted from FAA Advisory Circular AC 120-71A (2003); Tannenbaum & Cerasoli (2013). Do team and individual debriefs enhance performance? A meta-analysis. Human Factors, 55(1), 231–245; and
The JARTEL group (2012) NOTECHS Behavioral Marker System. Measurement Instrument Database for the Social Sciences. Retrieved April 5, 2013 from www.midss.ie.
Note 2. ‘‘Developing’’ replaces the term ‘‘very poor.’’ Very poor assessments are associated with top-down evaluations and a unilateral trainer9s perspective. Developing supports key safety culture concepts and
helps promote learning during a facilitative training/debrief process. This co-assessment process harnesses collective knowledge and supports a just culture-learning organization philosophy. Both trainer and pilot
crew fill out the CRM NOTECHS Assessment Form together about specific simulator event sets.

4
5

3

Leadership & management
skills
Decision-making &
adaptability
TmSA
Communication &
coordination
2

CRM elements

Overall Assessment of Flight Deck Team

Developing Very poor

TABLE 3
(Continued)

Proficient

Mastery

Comments
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environment, the behavioral instrument is implemented in a
nonpunitive crew concept developmental assessment process. This process describes a learning organization design
philosophy for aviation. Since assessment frameworks are
not universal, each organization will need to tailor Oshry’s
vision and these training instrument examples to their unique
culture and operating environment.
Conclusion
Captains’ invitational use of CRM elements to harness
the synergistic powers of aircrew makes the flight deck
subsystem robust and more resilient for all stakeholders.
Core OD principles that hold the CRM/TEM process
together for normal and novel operations include effective
communication—listen actively, share critical observations, encourage divergent views, verbalize SOPs—
leadership flexibility, division of duties, and Oshry’s
openness to balance differentiation, homogenization,
integration, and individuation. CRM/TEM and Oshry’s
openness make human multiprocessing possible with a
systems thinking framework for frontline workers. ‘‘A
holistic, problem-driven way of looking at the world with
a focus on relationships between system elements—
encourages us to think about relationships between people
and technology’’ (Vicente, 2006, pp. 46–49). ‘‘Leadership
development is ‘the expansion of a person’s capacity to be
effective in leadership roles and processes…to enable
groups of people to work together in productive and
meaningful ways’’’ (quoted in Distelhorst, n.d., p. 75,
from the Handbook of leadership development, 1998,
Center for Creative Leadership). As leaders we must go
beyond the rational, objective, unilateral view of ourselves
to a deeper, inner landscape where we affirm the
allegiance of individual core values with CRM core
values by cultivating community for the sake of both
knowing and doing, and by creating a learning organization for aviation where stakeholders can ‘‘uncover,
examine, and debunk the myth that institutions are
external to us and constrain us’’ (Palmer, 2007, p. 205).
A robust flight deck system can foster an environment
that balances a mechanistic dynamic driven by rational
management, legitimate authority—federal aviation regulation pilot-in-command rules—SOPs, and technology systems through open communication and flexible leadership.
By balancing Oshry’s elements we reveal our reflexive
behaviors to promote true partnership and individualism,
change conversation and culture for resilient flight decks,
and recognize that each person brings value to the whole
flight operation for optimal team performance.
References
Argyris, C. (2006). Teaching smart people how to learn. In J. Gallos (Ed.),
Organization development: A Jossey-Bass reader (pp. 267–285). San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

M. J. Stasio / Journal of Human Performance in Extreme Environments
Anca, J. (2010). Conversations on CRM from outside the USA. In B.
Kanki, R. Helmreich, & J. Anca (Eds.), Crew resource management
(2nd ed., pp. 435–444). London, UK: Academic Press.
Blake, R. R., Mouton, J. S., & CLR Steering Committee and Working
Groups, UAL. (1982). Cockpit resource management (CRM).
Retrieved from http://www.gridinternational.com/
Distelhorst, D. J., (n.d.). Session 3: System-wide interventions. In D.
Distelhorst (Ed.), An OD practitioner’s tool kit: Twenty years of
accumulated OD wisdom & methodologies (pp. 55–88). Spokane, WA:
Gonzaga University Bookstore.
Gawande, A. (2009). The checklist manifesto: How to get things right.
New York, NY: Picador.
Gunther, D. (2010). The airlines’ perspective: Effectively applying
CRM principles in today’s aviation environment. In B. Kanki, R.
Helmreich, & J. Anca (Eds.), Crew resource management (pp. 425–
434). London, UK: Academic Press.
Hamman, W., & Rutherford, W. L. (2010). The history in the basics and
the challenges for the future. In E. Salas & D. Maurino (Eds.), Human
factors in aviation (2nd ed., pp. 563–593). New York, NY: Academic
Press.
Helmreich, R. L., Merritt, A. C., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1999). The evolution
of crew resource management training in commercial aviation.
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(1), 19–32.
Kanki, B., Helmreich, R., & Anca, J. (2010). Crew resource management
(2nd ed.). London, UK: Academic Press.
Klein, G. (1998). Sources of power: How people make decisions.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Loukopoulos, L. D., Dismukes, R. K., & Barshi, I. (2009). The
multitasking myth: Handling complexity in real-world operations.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Orlady, L. M. (2010). Airline pilot training today and tomorrow. In B.
Kanki, R. Helmreich, & J. Anca (Eds.), Crew resource management
(pp. 469–492). London, UK: Academic Press.
Oshry, B. (1999). Leading systems: Lessons from the power lab. San
Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler.
Oshry, B. (2003). The merging cultures workshop trainer’s manual.
Boston, MA: Power + Systems, Inc.
Palmer, P. (2007). The courage to teach: Exploring the inner landscape
of a teacher’s life. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Salas, E., Fowlkes, J. E., Stout, R. J., Milanovich, D. M., & Prince, C.
(1999). Does CRM training improve teamwork skills in the cockpit?
Two evaluation studies. Human Factors, 41(2), 326–343.
Sales, M. (2006). Understanding the power of position. In J. Gallos (Ed.),
Organization development: A Jossey-Bass reader (pp. 322–343). San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Senge, P. (2006). The leader’s new work: Building learning organizations.
In J. Gallos (Ed.), Organization development: A Jossey-Bass reader
(pp. 765–792). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Schwarz, R. (2005). Understanding what guides your behavior. In R.
Schwarz, A. Davidson, P. Carlson, & S. McKinney (Eds.), The skilled
facilitator fieldbook: Tips, tools, and tested methods for consultants,
facilitators, managers, trainers, and coaches (pp. 33–60). San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Tannenbaum, S. I., & Cerasoli, C. P. (2013). Do team and individual
debriefs enhance performance? A meta-analysis. Human Factors,
55(1), 231–245.
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (2010, May/June). The wings of
change: Introducing the next generation air transportation system. FAA
Safety Briefing, 49(3).
Vicente, K. (2006). The human factor: Revolutionizing the way people live
with technology. New York, NY: Routledge.

